Perception plays a central and wide-ranging role in the philosophy of Margaret Cavendish. In this paper, I argue that Cavendish holds a naïve realist theory of perception. The case draws on what Cavendish has to say about perceptual presentation, the role of sympathy in experience, the natures of hallucination and of illusion, and the individuation of kinds. While Cavendish takes perception to have representational content, I explain how this is consistent with naïve realism. In closing, I address challenges to the interpretation, one of which turns on whether Cavendish allows for action at a distance. I argue that she does.

中文翻译：

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玛格丽特·卡文迪什是一个天真的现实主义者吗？

感知在玛格丽特·卡文迪什的哲学中起着核心和广泛的作用。在本文中，我认为卡文迪什持有一种朴素的现实主义感知理论。这个案例借鉴了卡文迪什关于知觉呈现、同情心在经验中的作用、幻觉和错觉的本质以及种类的个体化的说法。虽然卡文迪什认为感知具有代表性内容，但我解释了这如何与朴素现实主义相一致。最后，我提出了对解释的挑战，其中之一涉及卡文迪什是否允许远距离行动。我认为她确实如此。