Abstract

We consider the problem of a society that uses a voting rule to choose a subset from a given set of objects (candidates, binary issues, or alike). We assume that voters’ preferences over subsets of objects are separable: adding an object to a set leads to a better set if and only if the object is good (as a singleton set, the object is better than the empty set). A voting rule is strategy-proof if no voter benefits by not revealing its preferences truthfully and it is false-name-proof if no voter benefits by submitting several votes under other identities. We characterize all voting rules that satisfy false-name-proofness, strategy-proofness, and ontoness as the class of voting rules in which an object is chosen if it has either at least one vote in every society or a unanimous vote in every society. To do this, we first prove that if a voting rule is false-name-proof, strategy-proof, and onto, then the identities of the voters are not important.

中文翻译：

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可分离偏好下的防假名和防策略投票规则

摘要

我们考虑一个社会的问题，该社会使用投票规则从给定的一组对象（候选人、二元问题等）中选择一个子集。我们假设选民对对象子集的偏好是可分离的：当且仅当对象是好的（作为单例集，对象比空集更好）时，将对象添加到集合中会导致更好的集合。如果没有选民因不真实地透露其偏好而受益，则投票规则是策略证明的；如果没有选民通过以其他身份提交多张选票而受益，则投票规则是防假名的。我们将所有满足防伪性、防策略性和本体性的投票规则描述为一类投票规则，其中如果某个对象在每个社会中至少拥有一票或在每个社会中获得一致投票，则选择该对象。为此，我们首先证明，如果投票规则是防假名、防策略等，那么选民的身份并不重要。