Human behavior is flexibly regulated by specific goals of cognitive tasks. One notable example is goal-directed modulation of metacognitive behavior, where logically equivalent decision-making problems can yield different patterns of introspective confidence depending on the frame in which they are presented. While this observation highlights the important heuristic nature of metacognitive monitoring, computational mechanisms underlying this phenomenon remain elusive. We confirmed the confidence framing effect in two-alternative dot-number discrimination and in previously published preference-choice data, demonstrating distinctive confidence patterns between “choose more” or “choose less” frames. Formal model comparisons revealed a simple confidence heuristic behind this phenomenon, which assigns greater weight to chosen than unchosen stimulus evidence. This computation appears to be based on internal evidence constituted under specific task demands rather than physical stimulus intensity itself, a view justified in terms of ecological rationality. These results shed light on the adaptive nature of human decision-making and metacognitive monitoring.

人类行为受到认知任务的特定目标的灵活调节。一个值得注意的例子是元认知行为的目标导向调节，其中逻辑上等效的决策问题可以根据它们呈现的框架产生不同的内省信心模式。虽然这一观察强调了元认知监控的重要启发性质，但这种现象背后的计算机制仍然难以捉摸。我们证实了两种选择点数歧视和之前发布的偏好选择数据中的置信框架效应，证明了“选择更多”或“选择更少”框架之间独特的置信模式。正式的模型比较揭示了这种现象背后的一个简单的置信启发法，它对选择的刺激证据赋予比未选择的刺激证据更大的权重。这种计算似乎是基于特定任务要求下构成的内部证据，而不是物理刺激强度本身，这一观点在生态理性方面得到了证明。这些结果揭示了人类决策和元认知监控的适应性。