That bootstrapping and Moorean reasoning fail to instantiate persuasive argumentation is an often informally presented but not systematically developed view. In this paper, I will argue that this unpersuasiveness is not determined by principles of justification transmission but by two straightforward principles of rationality, understood as a concept of internal coherence. First, it is rational for S to believe the conclusion of an argument because of the argument, only if S believes sufficiently many premises of the argument. Second, if S doubts that a source O is reliable and believes that information i is delivered by O, then S rationally suspends judgment about the truth of i. This paper aims to accomplish two tasks. First, it provides a thorough analysis of why bootstrapping argumentation is not an instance of rational persuasion. Second, it contains a more general theory about preconditions and limits of persuasive argumentation.

自举推理和摩尔式推理无法实例化有说服力的论证，这是一种经常非正式提出但没有系统发展的观点。在本文中，我将论证这种不说服力不是由正当性传递原则决定的，而是由两个简单的理性原则决定的，被理解为内部连贯性的概念。首先，只有当 S 相信论证的足够多前提时，S 因为论证而相信论证的结论才是理性的。其次，如果S怀疑来源O的可靠性并相信信息i是由O传递的，那么S理性地暂停对i的真实性的判断。本文旨在完成两个任务。首先，它彻底分析了为什么自举论证不是理性说服的一个例子。其次，它包含了关于说服性论证的前提条件和限制的更一般的理论。