When one is intentionally doing something, one represents that thing as a goal to be accomplished. One represents it practically. How should we characterize this practical representation further? In this paper, I argue that when one is intentionally doing something, one's representation of it as a goal to be accomplished must also be knowledge that one is intentionally doing that thing. And I argue that this knowledge must itself be one's intentionally doing that thing. I aim to show, then, that insofar as representing practically just is knowing practically, it is equally acting intentionally.

中文翻译：

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行动中的代表

当一个人有意做某事时，就会将该事视为要实现的目标。一个实际代表它。我们应该如何进一步描述这种实际表现形式？在本文中，我认为，当一个人有意做某事时，他将其表示为要实现的目标也必须知道一个人正在有意做那件事。我认为这种知识本身一定是一个人有意做那件事。那么，我的目的是表明，就实际表现而言，实际上就是了解，它同样是有意行动。