Despite periods of resurgence over the last decades, it is safe to say that transcendental arguments no longer enjoy a prominent presence in the philosophical landscape. One reason for their declining prominence is the sustained suspicion that despite their self-proclaimed metaphysical neutrality, transcendental arguments are, in fact, metaphysically committed. This paper aims to revive the discussion of transcendental considerations by offering a metaphysically neutral account of transcendental arguments. I argue that a metaphysically neutral conception of transcendental arguments requires a revision of two concepts constitutive of transcendental claims, namely, transcendental necessity and the a priori. I propose a transcendental reading of Wittgenstein's On Certainty, which, I maintain, provides us with an alternative, metaphysically neutral understanding of these concepts. Thus revised, transcendental claims are suitable for what Mark Sacks once described as the “post-metaphysical” orientation of contemporary philosophy.

中文翻译：

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先验论证和形而上学中立：维特根斯坦的提议

尽管在过去几十年中出现了复兴，但可以肯定地说，先验论证不再在哲学领域占据突出地位。他们的声望下降的原因之一是人们持续怀疑，尽管他们自称形而上学中立，但先验论证实际上是形而上学的。本文旨在通过对先验论证提供形而上学中立的解释来复兴对先验考虑的讨论。我认为，先验论证的形而上学中立概念需要对构成先验主张的两个概念进行修正，即先验必然性和先验性。我建议先验地阅读维特根斯坦的《论确定性》，我认为它为我们提供了对这些概念的另一种、形而上学中立的理解。经过如此修改的先验主张适合马克·萨克斯曾经描述的当代哲学的“后形而上学”方向。