I address a family of objections I label the So What? objection to robust non-naturalist realism (or, just non-naturalism). This objection concludes that non-naturalism fails to identify the moral properties in virtue of failing to explain why non-natural properties would have all the features we expect moral properties to have and can be extended to provide the conclusion that the non-naturalist is therefore immoral. I argue that So What? is question-begging because it disallows non-naturalists their central theoretical claim: there are ethical properties iff they are fundamental properties (and, in virtue of that, non-natural). I then diagnose the error anti-non-naturalists make explicitly: those who object to non-naturalism along the lines of So What? either fail to understand precisely what the theory claims or fail to understand non-naturalist motivations for going in for that theory.

我解决了一系列反对意见，我将其标记为“那又怎样？” 反对强有力的非自然主义现实主义（或者只是非自然主义）。这一反对意见的结论是，非自然主义未能识别道德属性，因为未能解释为什么非自然属性将具有我们期望道德属性所具有的所有特征，并且可以扩展到提供非自然主义因此是非自然主义的结论。不道德。我认为那又怎样？这是引人质疑的，因为它不允许非自然主义者的核心理论主张：存在道德属性，当且仅当它们是基本属性（因此，非自然属性）。然后我诊断出反非自然主义者明确犯下的错误：那些按照“那又怎样？”的思路反对非自然主义的人？要么无法准确理解该理论的主张，要么无法理解接受该理论的非自然主义动机。