I show that conceptual philosophical anarchism, the claim that law cannot give reasons for action, is entailed by several popular theories about law. Reductionists about practical authority believe that all supposedly legitimate practical authority reduces to forms of theoretical authority. They tend to embrace anarchism, but some readers might not be clear why. Trigger theorists about reason-giving believe that all reason-giving merely activates pre-existing conditional reasons. Natural lawyers hold that all legal reasons are sourced in the natural law, which entails that positive law cannot provide reasons for action. If you are attracted to any of these theories and still think that positive law creates new practical reasons, you might have to give up one or the other position. If anarchism is entailed by believing the normativity in law’s directives pre-dates the directive, only a few may be able to avoid it, Hans Kelsen, Mark Greenberg, and Joseph Raz being the most likely.

中文翻译：

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如果……你可能是一个无政府主义者

我表明，概念性哲学无政府主义，即法律不能给出行动理由的主张，是由几种流行的法律理论所蕴含的。关于实践权威的还原论者认为，所有所谓合法的实践权威都可以简化为理论权威的形式。他们倾向于拥抱无政府主义，但一些读者可能不清楚为什么。关于给出理由的触发理论家认为，所有给出理由都只是激活预先存在的条件原因。自然法学家认为，一切法律理由都源于自然法，这意味着实在法不能提供行动理由。如果您被这些理论中的任何一种所吸引，并且仍然认为实在法创造了新的实践理由，那么您可能不得不放弃其中一个立场。如果无政府主义是通过相信法律指令中的规范性早于该指令而产生的，那么只有少数人可能能够避免它，汉斯·凯尔森、马克·格林伯格和约瑟夫·拉兹是最有可能的。