This paper explores the relationship between the questioning attitude of wondering and a class of attitudes I call epistemic desires. Broadly, these are desires to improve one’s epistemic position on some question. A common example is the attitude of wanting to know the answer to some question. I argue that one can have any kind of epistemic desire towards any question, Q, without necessarily wondering Q, but not conversely. That is, one cannot wonder Q without having at least some epistemic desire directed towards Q. I defend this latter claim from apparent counterexamples due to Friedman and Drucker, and finish with a proposal on which epistemic desires, particularly the desire for understanding, play an explanatory role in distinguishing wondering from other forms of question-directed thought.

中文翻译：

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好奇和认知欲望

本文探讨了好奇的质疑态度与我称之为认知欲望的一类态度之间的关系。从广义上讲，这些是改善一个人在某些问题上的认知立场的愿望。一个常见的例子是想要知道某个问题答案的态度。我认为，一个人可以对任何问题 Q 抱有任何一种认知欲望，而不必想知道 Q，但反之则不然。也就是说，如果没有至少一些针对 Q 的认知欲望，一个人就无法想知道 Q。我用弗里德曼和德鲁克的明显反例来捍卫后一种说法，并以一个提议结束，在该提议中，认知欲望，特别是理解的欲望，发挥着重要作用。区分好奇与其他形式的问题导向思维的解释作用。