In a context of intensifying great power competition and deep divergences of view between nuclear and non-nuclear powers on the urgency of nuclear abolition, ‘nuclear risk reduction’ has gained renewed attention as a pragmatic framework for managing and progressively reducing nuclear dangers. The idea is simple: with more fundamental policy changes either undesirable or out of reach, advocates of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament should focus their efforts on the international community's shared interest in reducing the risk of nuclear use and escalation, identifying and implementing limited measures to sequester nuclear risk scenarios. Drawing on historical scholarship, archival documents and theories of ‘normal’ and ‘epistemic’ accidents, we argue that the risk reduction agenda offers a false promise for those seeking durable, shared solutions to the nuclear predicament. The risk reduction framework demands access to an unattainable level of knowledge, encourages overconfidence in managerial control and fails to provide meaningful policy guidance. Examining in detail the scholarship of Thomas Schelling, we maintain that the risk reduction agenda remains heavily circumscribed by the requirements of credible nuclear deterrence.

中文翻译：

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减少核风险的虚假承诺

在大国竞争加剧、核国家与无核国家对废除核的紧迫性存在深刻分歧的背景下，“减少核风险”作为管理和逐步减少核危险的务实框架再次受到关注。这个想法很简单：由于更根本的政策变化要么是不可取的，要么是遥不可及的，核不扩散和核裁军的倡导者应该将其努力集中在国际社会的共同利益上，即减少核使用和核升级的风险，确定和实施有限的措施隔离核风险情景。借鉴历史学术、档案文件以及“正常”和“认知”事故的理论，我们认为降低风险议程为那些寻求持久、共同解决核困境的人提供了虚假的承诺。降低风险框架要求获得无法达到的知识水平，鼓励对管理控制的过度自信，并且无法提供有意义的政策指导。详细审视托马斯·谢林的学术成果后，我们认为降低风险议程仍然受到可靠核威慑要求的严重限制。