The article uses the case of the development of the European Union Battlegroups to the Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC) to better understand the changing learning capacity of the EU in its military Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The article develops a theoretical framework to capture the most significant factors affecting learning by drawing on insights from the literatures on organizational learning and policy failure, with a specific focus on military organizations and CSDP. This framework is then used to study to what degree the EU has learnt the right lessons from the creeping failure of the Battlegroups, which factors affected learning, and to what degree the EU suffers from specific learning pathologies. The article draws on elite interviews, secondary and grey literature, and the high-level practitioner experience of one author. It finds that the EU has improved its learning capacities and correctly identified most of the military-operational root causes of the failure, yet struggled to correctly identify or address the political–strategic ones. This article offers insights to practitioners on where to best target efforts to improve learning. The theoretical framework could help to illuminate the challenges of political–military learning in multi-national regional organizations under difficult epistemic conditions.

中文翻译：

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从欧盟战斗群到快速部署能力：吸取正确的教训？

本文以欧盟战斗群向快速部署能力（RDC）的发展为例，更好地理解欧盟在军事共同安全与防务政策（CSDP）中不断变化的学习能力。本文借鉴有关组织学习和政策失败的文献的见解，建立了一个理论框架，以捕获影响学习的最重要因素，特别关注军事组织和 CSDP。然后用这个框架来研究欧盟在多大程度上从战斗群的逐渐失败中吸取了正确的教训，哪些因素影响了学习，以及欧盟在多大程度上遭受了特定的学习病态。本文借鉴了精英访谈、二手文献和灰色文献以及一位作者的高水平从业经验。研究发现，欧盟提高了学习能力，并正确识别了失败的大部分军事行动根源，但难以正确识别或解决政治战略问题。本文为从业者提供了关于如何最好地努力改善学习的见解。该理论框架有助于阐明在困难的认知条件下跨国区域组织中政治军事学习的挑战。