What happens among intelligence communities when two countries face a diplomatic crisis? This article looks at the interactions between the West German Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV) and Israel's Mossad in a multilateral liaison called the Club de Berne after the Munich Olympics attack in September 1972. The article shows that these covert links were a means to overcome the crisis and served different functions for each side. For the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), which had been severely criticized after giving in to terrorist pressure, the BfV tried to prove to Israel its value as a security asset. For Israel, the Club de Berne allowed Mossad to send a covert message that aimed to pressure the FRG into a no-negotiation line. For both, the agencies could build on preexisting relations based on trust in the Club de Berne, which helped with the normalization process after the crisis. Although diplomatic and domestic policies after the Munich attack are well known, the intelligence dimension has thus far not been explored. The article offers a new way of thinking about covert diplomacy in theory and practice.

中文翻译：

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克服危机的秘密外交：慕尼黑奥运会袭击后西德和以色列情报部门

当两国面临外交危机时，情报界会发生什么？本文着眼于 1972 年 9 月慕尼黑奥运会袭击事件后，西德联邦联邦安全局 (BfV) 和以色列摩萨德在名为伯尔尼俱乐部的多边联络机构中的互动。文章表明，这些秘密联系是克服威胁的一种手段。危机并为双方发挥不同的作用。对于屈服于恐怖分子压力而受到严厉批评的德意志联邦共和国来说，BfV试图向以色列证明其作为安全资产的价值。对于以色列来说，伯尔尼俱乐部允许摩萨德发出秘密信息，旨在向西德施压，使其走上不谈判路线。对于双方来说，这些机构可以在对伯尔尼俱乐部的信任基础上建立现有关系，这有助于危机后的正常化进程。尽管慕尼黑袭击事件后的外交和国内政策众所周知，但情报层面迄今为止尚未得到探讨。文章从理论和实践上为隐蔽外交提供了一种新的思考方式。