A veteran U.S. diplomat, who is now one of the last living participants in the U.S.-Soviet summit meeting at Reykjavik in October 1986, traces the genesis, nature, and aftermath of that summit. He recounts changes in U.S.-Soviet relations during the first several years of the Reagan administration, including important events such as the 1983 Pentecostalist negotiations, the shootdown of a South Korean passenger airliner by Soviet air defense forces, and the meeting between Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev in Geneva in November 1985. Even though scholars in retrospect have looked on the Reykjavik summit as a turning point, it began as a failure. Two leaders, who became exhausted as the proceedings wore on, engaged in a momentous exchange on nuclear elimination but then doubled down on incompatible positions regarding strategic ballistic missile defense (BMD). Reagan sought a “personal favor,” as he had with Gorbachev's predecessors three years earlier regarding the Pentecostals, whereas Gorbachev pushed for strict limits on BMD as a matter of “principle.” Both sides then scrambled to salvage the future, in an interpretive effort, centered on the leaders’ personal relationship, that ultimately yielded today's favorable view of Reykjavik's place in history.

中文翻译：

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雷克雅未克近距离：里根和戈尔巴乔夫，1986 年 10 月及之后

一位资深美国外交官现在是 1986 年 10 月在雷克雅未克举行的美苏峰会的最后在世参与者之一，他追溯了那次峰会的起源、性质和后果。他讲述了里根政府头几年美苏关系的变化，包括1983年五旬节派谈判、苏联防空部队击落韩国客机以及罗纳德·里根和米哈伊尔会面等重要事件。 1985 年 11 月，戈尔巴乔夫在日内瓦。尽管学者们在回顾过去时将雷克雅未克峰会视为一个转折点，但它一开始就是失败的。随着会议进程的进行，两位领导人变得疲惫不堪，他们就消除核问题进行了重要交流，但随后又在战略弹道导弹防御（BMD）问题上加倍强调了不相容的立场。里根寻求“个人恩惠”，就像三年前他对戈尔巴乔夫的前任就五旬节派所做的那样，而戈尔巴乔夫则将严格限制弹道导弹防御作为“原则”。随后，双方都在以领导人个人关系为中心的解释性努力中争先恐后地挽救未来，最终形成了今天对雷克雅未克历史地位的有利看法。