We use a proprietary database with detailed, employee-specific compensation contract information for rank-and-file corporate accountants who are directly involved in the financial reporting process to assess their influence on their firms' financial reporting quality. Theory predicts that paying above-market wages can both attract employees with more human capital and subsequently encourage better performance. Consistent with audit committees structuring accountants' compensation to mitigate financial misreporting that might otherwise occur, we find that firms with relatively well-paid accountants tend to issue higher-quality financial reports. Moreover, this relationship is more pronounced when firms’ senior executives have stronger contractual incentives to misreport and when the audit committee is more independent from management.

中文翻译：

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普通会计员工的薪酬和财务报告质量

我们使用专有数据库，为直接参与财务报告流程的普通公司会计师提供详细的、特定于员工的薪酬合同信息，以评估他们对公司财务报告质量的影响。理论预测，支付高于市场的工资既可以吸引拥有更多人力资本的员工，也可以鼓励更好的绩效。与审计委员会构建会计师薪酬以减少可能发生的财务误报的情况一致，我们发现拥有相对高薪会计师的公司往往会发布更高质量的财务报告。此外，当公司高级管理人员有更强的误报合同激励以及审计委员会更加独立于管理层时，这种关系更加明显。