We study a novel database of intellectual property (IP) licensing agreements sourced from filings made by publicly listed corporations, a large fraction of which firms (initially) disclose with redacted terms. In contrast to the benchmark that IP quality alone determines the pricing of IP, we argue that bargaining power between licensing counterparties plays a critical role in explaining several patterns in observed royalty rates. Licensors with differentiated technology and high market power charge higher royalty rates, while larger-than-rival licensees pay lower royalty rates. Licensors command premium royalty rates for contract exclusivity, especially in competitive markets. Finally, we employ this framework and setting to understand the pricing implications of nondisclosure: licensors redact payment terms when they transact at lower royalty rates, consistent with preserving bargaining power for future negotiations. Our findings offer a new explanation for innovator secrecy and have several practical takeaways for transfer pricing and patent litigation.

中文翻译：

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知识产权市场的议价能力：来自许可合同条款的证据

我们研究了一个新颖的知识产权 (IP) 许可协议数据库，该数据库源自上市公司提交的文件，其中很大一部分公司（最初）以经过编辑的条款披露。与知识产权质量本身决定知识产权定价的基准相反，我们认为许可交易对手之间的讨价还价能力在解释观察到的特许权使用费率的几种模式方面发挥着关键作用。拥有差异化技术和高市场影响力的许可人收取更高的特许权使用费，而规模超过竞争对手的被许可人则支付更低的特许权使用费。许可方为合同排他性收取高额特许权使用费，尤其是在竞争激烈的市场中。最后，我们利用这个框架和设置来理解保密的定价影响：许可方在以较低的特​​许权使用费率进行交易时编辑付款条款，这与保留未来谈判的议价能力是一致的。我们的研究结果为创新者保密提供了新的解释，并对转让定价和专利诉讼提供了一些实用的启示。