While firms engage stakeholders in their sustainability practices to contribute to a better world resiliently and responsibly, little is known about what drives their ability to generate customer engagement (CE) and supplier engagement (SE) for sustainability purposes. This paper identifies, theorizes, and empirically validates the differential roles of board oversight and incentivization, along with contingencies (a chief marketing officer’s (CMO) presence and governance disclosure), in driving CE and SE. Using data from 308 firms, the paper finds that while board oversight and incentivization positively affect CE, only incentivization positively affects SE. The paper also finds significant moderation effects of CMO presence and governance disclosure. Through multiple post hoc analyses, the paper explores how CE and SE influence firm performance. The paper provides a nuanced understanding of incentive types’ effects and contributes to the literature on grand challenges connecting firms’ strategies and sustainability objectives to customer and supplier engagement.

虽然企业让利益相关者参与其可持续发展实践，以弹性和负责任的方式为更美好的世界做出贡献，但人们对是什么驱动他们为可持续发展目的而产生客户参与（CE）和供应商参与（SE）的能力知之甚少。本文对董事会监督和激励以及意外事件（首席营销官 (CMO) 的存在和治理披露）在推动 CE 和 SE 方面的不同作用进行了识别、理论化和实证验证。该论文利用 308 家公司的数据发现，虽然董事会监督和激励对 CE 产生积极影响，但只有激励对 SE 产生积极影响。该论文还发现 CMO 的存在和治理披露具有显着的调节作用。通过多次事后分析，本文探讨了 CE 和 SE 如何影响公司绩效。本文提供了对激励类型影响的细致入微的理解，并为有关将公司战略和可持续发展目标与客户和供应商参与联系起来的重大挑战的文献做出了贡献。