The power to make constitutions (the so-called constituent power) is predominantly understood today as a legally unlimited power belonging to the people. This understanding sits uncomfortably with constitutionalism: the idea that public powers are legally limited. Would such a power not leave an indelible blemish on constitutions that are otherwise committed to constitutionalism? This article shows that this problem, which I call the Stain of Constitutionalism, stems from a misapprehension of what constituent power was originally understood to be. Focusing closely on the writings of Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès, Thomas Paine, and the Marquis de Condorcet, I demonstrate that, far from adopting it, these founding fathers of constituent power theory rejected the notion of unlimited constituent power. Instead, they defended a natural rights approach according to which constituent power is legally limited by considerations such as freedom and equality.

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自然权利、立宪权与宪政主义的污点

今天，制定宪法的权力（所谓的制宪权）主要被理解为属于人民的法律上不受限制的权力。这种理解与宪政主义相悖：公共权力受到法律限制。这样的权力难道不会给原本致力于宪政的宪法留下不可磨灭的污点吗？本文表明，这个我称之为宪政污点的问题源于对制宪权最初含义的误解。我密切关注伊曼纽尔·约瑟夫·西耶斯、托马斯·潘恩和孔多塞侯爵的著作，证明这些制宪权理论的奠基人非但没有采用它，反而拒绝了无限制宪权的概念。相反，他们捍卫自然权利方法，根据该方法，宪法权力在法律上受到自由和平等等考虑因素的限制。