Phenomenological discussions of sociality have long been concerned with the relations between the I, the You, and the We. Recently, dialogue between phenomenology and analytic philosophical work on collective intentionality has given rise to a corpus of literature oriented around the first-person plural “we.” In this paper, I demonstrate how these dominant accounts of the “we” are not exhaustive of first-person plural experiences as such. I achieve these aims by arguing for a phenomenological distinction between an experience of being part of a “we” compared to an experience of being part of an “us.” To have a “we-experience” there must be a plurality of (unified) subjects sharing in an experience together such that the experience has the phenomenal character of being ours. An “us-experience,” on the other hand, requires the experiential salience of an external “Third” in a way that is constitutively significant. Drawing on Sartrean social ontology, I argue that the “us” is distinct from the “we” on three levels, all of which pertain to the constitutive and unifying role of the Third. I then outline two forms of us-experiences: (1) the experience of being grouped and (2) the experience of apprehending one's seriality.

中文翻译：

---

我们和我们：第一人称复数的第三个力量

对社会性的现象学讨论长期以来一直关注“我”、“你”和“我们”之间的关系。最近，现象学和关于集体意向性的分析哲学著作之间的对话产生了围绕第一人称复数“我们”的文学语料库。在本文中，我证明了这些对“我们”的主导描述并没有详尽地描述第一人称多元体验。我通过论证作为“我们”一部分的体验与作为“我们”一部分的体验之间的现象学区别来实现这些目标。为了拥有“我们的体验”，必须有多个（统一的）主体共同分享一种体验，这样该体验就具有属于我们的现象特征。另一方面，“我们的经验”需要外部“第三者”的经验显着性，其方式具有本质意义。借鉴萨特的社会本体论，我认为“我们”在三个层面上与“我们”不同，所有这些都与第三者的构成性和统一作用有关。然后，我概述了两种形式的我们体验：（1）被分组的体验和（2）理解一个人的连续性的体验。