The claim that perfect hallucination is introspectively indistinguishable from perception has been a centrepiece of philosophical theorizing about sense experience. The most common interpretation of the indistinguishability claim is modal: that it is impossible to distinguish perfect hallucination from perception through introspection alone. I run through various models of introspection and show that none of them can accommodate the modal interpretation. Rejecting the modal interpretation opens up two alternative interpretations of the indistinguishability claim. According to the generic interpretation, hallucination is indistinguishable from perception despite the existence of possible exceptions, while according to the actuality interpretation, the indistinguishability of hallucination from perception consists in the actual failure to distinguish hallucination from perception. These alternative understandings of the indistinguishability claim have a number of significant implications for the problem of perception, including the rejection of perfect hallucination and illusion in favour of our ordinary, non-philosophical concepts of these states.

中文翻译：

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完美与平凡：不可区分与幻觉

完美幻觉与知觉在内省时无法区分的主张一直是关于感官体验的哲学理论的核心。对不可区分性主张最常见的解释是模态的：仅通过内省不可能区分完美的幻觉和知觉。我浏览了各种内省模型，并表明它们都不能适应模态解释。拒绝模态解释开辟了对不可区分性主张的两种替代解释。根据一般解释，幻觉与知觉无法区分，尽管可能存在例外；而根据现实解释，幻觉与知觉的不可区分在于实际上无法区分幻觉与知觉。这些对不可区分性主张的替代理解对知觉问题有许多重要的影响，包括拒绝完美的幻觉和错觉，转而支持我们对这些状态的普通的、非哲学的概念。