Predictive processing models are often ascribed a certain generality in conceptually unifying the relationships between perception, action, and cognition or the potential to posit a ‘grand unified theory’ of the mind. The limitations of this unification can be seen when these models are applied to specific cognitive phenomena or phenomenal consciousness. Our article discusses these shortcomings for predictive processing models of hallucinations by the example of the Charles-Bonnet-Syndrome. This case study shows that the current predictive processing account omits essential characteristics of stimulus-independent perception in general, which has critical phenomenological implications. We argue that the most popular predictive processing model of hallucinatory conditions – the strong prior hypothesis – fails to fully account for the characteristics of nonveridical perceptual experiences associated with Charles-Bonnet-Syndrome. To fill this explanatory gap, we propose that the strong prior hypothesis needs to include reality monitoring to apply to more than just veridical percepts.

预测处理模型通常在概念上统一感知、行动和认知之间的关系或提出心理“大统一理论”的潜力方面具有一定的普遍性。当这些模型应用于特定的认知现象或现象意识时，可以看到这种统一的局限性。我们的文章以查尔斯-博内综合症为例讨论了幻觉预测处理模型的这些缺点。该案例研究表明，当前的预测处理帐户通常忽略了与刺激无关的感知的基本特征，这具有重要的现象学含义。我们认为，最流行的幻觉条件预测处理模型——强先验假设——未能充分解释与查尔斯-博内综合症相关的非真实感知体验的特征。为了填补这一解释性空白，我们建议强有力的先验假设需要包括现实监控，以不仅仅适用于真实的感知。