Realists about possible worlds typically identify possible worlds with abstract objects, such as propositions or properties. However, they face a significant objection due to Lewis (1986), to the effect that there is no way to explain how possible worlds-as-abstract objects represent possibilities. In this paper, I describe a response to this objection on behalf of realists. The response is to identify possible worlds with propositions, but to deny that propositions are abstract objects, or indeed objects at all. Instead, I argue that realists should follow Prior (1971) and others in treating higher-order quantification (e.g. quantification into predicate or sentence position) as a genuine form of quantification in its own right, and so in particular, not to be analysed in terms of first-order quantification over abstract objects. I argue that from this ‘higher-orderist’ perspective, there is a relatively straightforward answer to the question of how possible worlds-as-propositions succeed in representing possibilities.

中文翻译：

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作为命题的可能世界

关于可能世界的现实主义者通常用抽象对象（例如命题或属性）来识别可能世界。然而，他们面临着刘易斯（Lewis，1986）的重大反对，大意是没有办法解释作为抽象对象的可能世界如何代表可能性。在本文中，我代表现实主义者描述了对这一反对意见的回应。回应是用命题来识别可能的世界，但否认命题是抽象对象，或者根本就是对象。相反，我认为实在论者应该遵循 Prior (1971) 和其他人的观点，将高阶量化（例如量化到谓词或句子位置）视为一种真正的量化形式，因此特别不要在抽象对象的一阶量化术语。我认为，从这种“高阶主义”的角度来看，对于作为命题的可能世界如何成功地代表可能性的问题有一个相对直接的答案。