Bringing home federal spending projects to the district is a common reelection strategy for members of the U.S. Congress, and congresswomen tend to outperform congressmen in securing district spending. However, for legislators to turn distributive benefits into higher approval and electoral rewards, constituents must recognize that public spending has taken place in their community and attribute credit to the correct public official. I theorize that congresswomen face a gender bias when claiming credit for federal projects, and I test this theory through an online survey experiment. Contrary to expectations, I find no evidence that legislator gender influences the public’s reaction to congressional credit claims, indicating that congresswomen can effectively use distributive politics to counter gendered vulnerability in the U.S. Congress. This research advances the literature on gender and politics by investigating whether a gender bias in credit claiming prevents congresswomen from turning their representational efforts into electoral capital.

中文翻译：

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更多的钱，更少的信用？立法者性别与国会信用主张的有效性

将联邦支出项目带回选区是美国国会议员连任的常见策略，而女议员在确保选区支出方面往往优于国会议员。然而，为了让立法者将分配利益转化为更高的支持率和选举奖励，选民必须认识到公共支出已经发生在他们的社区，并将功劳归于正确的公职人员。我的理论是，国会女议员在为联邦项目申请功劳时面临性别偏见，我通过在线调查实验检验了这一理论。与预期相反，我没有发现任何证据表明立法者性别会影响公众对国会信用主张的反应，这表明女议员可以有效地利用分配政治来应对美国国会中的性别脆弱性。这项研究通过调查信贷申请中的性别偏见是否妨碍国会女议员将她们的代表努力转化为选举资本，推进了有关性别和政治的文献。