In this article, I argue that if tacit knowledge of grammar is analyzable in functional-computational terms, then it cannot ground linguistic meaning, structure, or sound. If to know or cognize a grammar is to be in a certain computational state playing a certain functional role, there can be no unique grammar cognized. Satisfying the functional conditions for cognizing a grammar G entails satisfying those for cognizing many grammars disagreeing with G about expressions' semantic, phonetic, and syntactic values. This threatens the Chomskyan view that expressions have such values for speakers because they cognize grammars assigning them those values. For if this is true, semantics, syntax, and phonology must be indeterminate, thanks to the indeterminacy of grammar-cognizing (qua functional-computational state). So, the fact that a speaker cognizes a grammar cannot explain the determinate character of their language.

中文翻译：

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功能主义和语法隐性知识

在本文中，我认为，如果语法的隐性知识可以用功能计算术语进行分析，那么它就不能奠定语言意义、结构或声音的基础。如果认识或认知一个语法是在某种计算状态下发挥某种功能作用，那么就不可能有唯一的语法被认知。满足认知语法G的功能条件需要满足认知许多与G在表达式的语义、语音和句法值方面不一致的语法的功能条件。这威胁到了乔姆斯基的观点，即表达式对于说话者来说具有这样的价值，因为他们认知语法赋予他们这些价值。因为如果这是真的，那么由于语法认知（作为功能计算状态）的不确定性，语义、句法和音系必定是不确定的。因此，说话者认知语法这一事实并不能解释其语言的确定特征。