In this paper, I take a fresh look at Husserl's key distinction between objectifying and non-objectifying acts, which roughly amounts to a distinction between presentational and evaluative experiences. My goal is to provide a clear and unified reconstruction of Husserl's argument for the thesis that non-objectifying acts are necessarily founded in objectifying acts, a thesis that is highly controversial in and beyond Husserlian scholarship. In the first section, I reconstruct Husserl's view in the Logical Investigations, according to which only objectifying acts establish an independent intentional relation to their objects, and argue that it is justified by the positing function of objectifying acts. In the second section, I address two problematic interpretations of this view and, after criticizing them, I present what I take to be Husserl's core argument for his position. In the third section, I turn to the revision of the view of the Logical Investigations that Husserl proposes in the wake of his transcendental turn, especially in Ideas I and II. On Husserl's revised view, all acts are objectifying, including emotional acts [Gemütsakte]. This revision has led scholars to consider Husserl's view aporetic. I propose an alternative interpretation that dispels the purported aporia. I conclude with some remarks on the costs and benefits of my reading, as well as the strengths and weaknesses of Husserl's view in general.

中文翻译：

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演讲和评价：重新审视胡塞尔对客体化行为和非客体化行为的区分

在本文中，我重新审视了胡塞尔对客体化行为和非客体化行为的关键区别，这大致相当于表象体验和评价体验之间的区别。我的目标是为胡塞尔的论点提供清晰而统一的重构，即非客体化行为必然建立在客体化行为之上，这一论点在胡塞尔学术界内外都极具争议。在第一节中，我重构了胡塞尔在《逻辑研究》中的观点，认为只有客体化行为才与其客体建立起独立的意向关系，并认为这一观点是由客体化行为的设定功能所证明的。在第二部分中，我讨论了对该观点的两种有问题的解释，并在批评它们之后，提出了我认为胡塞尔支持其立场的核心论点。在第三节中，我转向对胡塞尔在先验转向之后所提出的逻辑研究观点的修正，特别是在《理念一》和《理念二》中。根据胡塞尔修正后的观点，所有行为都是客体化的，包括情感行为[ Gemütsakte ]。这一修正导致学者们认为胡塞尔的观点是不可能的。我提出了另一种解释，以消除所谓的难题。最后，我对阅读的成本和收益以及胡塞尔观点的总体优点和缺点进行了一些评论。