I argue for an account of grasping, or understanding that, on which we grasp via a higher-order mental act of Husserlian fulfillment. Fulfillment is the act of matching up the objects of our phenomenally presentational experiences with those of our phenomenally representational thought. Grasping-by-fulfilling is importantly different from standard epistemic aims, in part because it is phenomenal rather than inferential. (I endorse Bourget's (2017) arguments to that effect.) I show that grasping-by-fulfilling cannot be a species of propositional knowledge or belief, and that it is not essentially connected to justification. I motivate a revisionary epistemology on which achieving propositional knowledge and coming to grasp are dual epistemic aims. My account makes sense of a common occurrence—that we are often unmoved to act on our beliefs until we come to phenomenally experience them in some way. It also explains puzzling features of human inquiry.

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玛丽为什么离开她的房间

我主张对把握或理解这一点的解释，我们通过胡塞尔实现的高阶心理行为来把握这一点。实现是将我们现象表征经验的对象与我们现象表征思想的对象相匹配的行为。通过实现来掌握与标准的认知目标有很大不同，部分原因是它是现象性的而不是推论性的。（我赞同布尔歇（Bourget，2017）关于这一点的论点。）我表明，通过实现来把握不可能是一种命题知识或信念，并且它本质上与论证没有联系。我提出了一种修正认识论，在该认识论中，获得命题知识和掌握知识是双重认识目标。我的解释解释了一个常见的现象——我们常常无动于衷地按照自己的信念行事，直到我们以某种方式非凡地体验到它们。它还解释了人类探究的令人困惑的特征。