Many philosophers endorse the Transparency Thesis, the claim that by introspection one cannot become aware of one's experience. Recently, some authors have suggested that the Transparency Thesis is challenged by introspective states reached under mindfulness. We label this the Mindfulness Opacity Hypothesis. The present paper develops the hypothesis in important new ways. First, we motivate the hypothesis by drawing on recent clinical psychology and cognitive science of mindfulness. Secondly, we develop the hypothesis by describing the implied shift in experiential perspective, the scope of introspectable qualities, and the level of skill. Thirdly, we defend the hypothesis against various philosophical arguments. We conclude that the Mindfulness Opacity Hypothesis is empirically and theoretically well motivated and supported.

中文翻译：

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透明度和正念不透明假说

许多哲学家都支持透明论，即通过内省，一个人无法意识到自己的经历。最近，一些作者提出，透明度论点受到正念下达到的内省状态的挑战。我们将此称为正念不透明假说。本文以重要的新方式发展了这一假设。首先，我们利用最近的临床心理学和正念认知科学来激发这一假设。其次，我们通过描述经验视角的隐含转变、内省品质的范围和技能水平来提出假设。第三，我们针对各种哲学论证来捍卫这一假设。我们的结论是，正念不透明假说在经验和理论上都有充分的动机和支持。