We commonly explain the distinctive prudential and moral status of persons in terms of our mental capacities. I draw from recent work to argue that the common explanation is incomplete. I then develop a new explanation: We are ethically important because we are the object of a pattern of self-concern. I argue that the view solves moral problems posed by permissive ontologies, such as the recent personite problem.

中文翻译：

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如何解释人的重要性

我们通常用我们的心理能力来解释人独特的审慎和道德状态。我从最近的研究中得出结论，普遍的解释是不完整的。然后我提出了一个新的解释：我们在道德上很重要，因为我们是自我关注模式的对象。我认为这种观点解决了宽容本体论带来的道德问题，例如最近的人格问题。