This paper analyses data from a novel collective agri-environmental scheme (cAES) in Alsace, France, designed to protect the local European hamster population by motivating farmers to engage in habitat conservation measures. In contrast to typical conservation contracts that pay individual farmers based on their own performance, the cAES studied here pays farmers only when the percentage of land conserved by all farmers within a collective zone reaches a critical threshold. We find that the likelihood of participation is higher for farmers with a relatively large agricultural surface within the collective zone, increases with the number of farmers in a collective zone, and increases over time. Those with more land in the collective zone allocate more acreage to conservation. We define different contributor types and provide insight into the possible motives underlying contributions to collective conservation schemes.

中文翻译：

---

集体农业环境计划中的协调农场：有条件激励的作用

本文分析了法国阿尔萨斯一项新型集体农业环境计划 (cAES) 的数据，该计划旨在通过激励农民采取栖息地保护措施来保护当地的欧洲仓鼠种群。与根据农民个人绩效支付费用的典型保护合同不同，这里研究的 cAES 仅当集体区内所有农民保护的土地百分比达到临界阈值时才向农民支付费用。我们发现，集体区内农业面积较大的农户参与的可能性较高，并且随着集体区内农户数量的增加而增加，并随着时间的推移而增加。集体区内拥有更多土地的人会分配更多面积进行保护。