There is a well-known argument against irreducibly normative properties that appeals to the following claim about supervenience: for all possible worlds W and W*, if the instantiation of descriptive properties in W and W* is exactly the same, then the instantiation of normative properties in W and W* is also exactly the same. This claim used to be uncontroversial, but recently several philosophers have challenged it. Do these challenges undermine this argument? I argue that they do not, since the negation of this claim about supervenience has consequences that are much more implausible than the negations of key premises in these challenges.

中文翻译：

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挺身而出，争取附带性

有一个众所周知的反对不可约规范属性的论点，它诉诸于以下关于随附性的主张：对于所有可能的世界 W 和 W*，如果 W 和 W* 中描述性属性的实例化完全相同，那么规范性的实例化W 和 W* 的性质也完全相同。这种说法过去没有争议，但最近一些哲学家对此提出了挑战。这些挑战是否削弱了这一论点？我认为他们不这样做，因为否定这种附带性主张所产生的后果比否定这些挑战中的关键前提更令人难以置信。