We examine the linkages between firms' M&A activity and the information exchange between executives and analysts during quarterly earnings calls. Prior M&A research has mostly focused on the considerations presented by information asymmetry between buyers and sellers themselves in M&A. However, these concerns also exist between the buying firm's executives and capital markets. We examine whether firms' M&A activity results in an information exchange between executives and analysts that highlights corporate strategy as a discussion topic. Thus, we test whether there is consistency between firms' corporate growth agendas and the information released to the public by these firms. This question is relevant, as disclosure is central to firms' ability to raise capital and compete. We also investigate the degree to which these information exchanges affect analysts' earnings forecast errors.

我们研究了公司的并购活动与季度收益电话会议期间高管和分析师之间的信息交换之间的联系。以往的并购研究大多集中于并购中买卖双方本身信息不对称所带来的考量。然而，这些担忧也存在于收购公司高管和资本市场之间。我们研究公司的并购活动是否会导致高管和分析师之间的信息交换，从而将公司战略作为讨论主题。因此，我们测试了企业的企业增长议程与这些企业向公众发布的信息之间是否存在一致性。这个问题是相关的，因为披露对于公司筹集资金和竞争的能力至关重要。我们还调查了这些信息交换对分析师盈利预测误差的影响程度。