Changing workplace dynamics have led employers to increasingly adopt electronic monitoring technologies so supervisors can observe and ensure employee compliance and productivity—outcomes the monitoring literature has long supported. Yet, employee productivity depends on strong leader–member social exchange, and the relational consequences of electronic monitoring for supervisor and employee are not well understood. To help resolve this tension within the monitoring literature and add understanding in regard to the effects of electronic monitoring on employee productivity, we use social exchange theory to examine the implications of electronic monitoring for the supervisor–employee exchange relationship. We theorize that electronic monitoring facilitates (rather than inhibits) production deviance and inhibits (rather than facilitates) task performance by undermining the exchange of social benefits and, consequently, eroding leader–member social exchange. Yet, we also hypothesize that supervisors who give performance monitoring data back to employees in a developmental way (i.e., developmental feedback) compensate for the loss of certain social benefits, and, thereby, buffer the negative relational consequences of electronic monitoring. Across an experimental online study and a field study, we find converging support for our predictions and rule out alternative explanations. This research provides timely insights into how to effectively use electronic monitoring without promoting unintended consequences.

中文翻译：

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老大哥的麻烦：电子监控通过侵蚀领导者与成员之间的社会交流而产生适得其反的后果

不断变化的工作场所动态导致雇主越来越多地采用电子监控技术，以便主管可以观察并确保员工的合规性和生产力——监控文献长期以来支持的结果。然而，员工的生产力取决于强有力的领导者与成员之间的社会交换，而电子监控对主管和员工的关系后果尚不清楚。为了帮助解决监控文献中的这种紧张关系，并增加对电子监控对员工生产力影响的理解，我们使用社会交换理论来研究电子监控对主管与员工交换关系的影响。我们的理论是，电子监控通过破坏社会利益的交换，从而削弱领导者与成员之间的社会交换，从而促进（而不是抑制）生产偏差并抑制（而不是促进）任务绩效。然而，我们还假设，主管以发展的方式（即发展反馈）将绩效监控数据反馈给员工，以补偿某些社会福利的损失，从而缓冲电子监控的负面关系后果。通过实验性在线研究和实地研究，我们发现了对我们的预测的一致支持，并排除了其他解释。这项研究提供了关于如何有效使用电子监控而不引发意外后果的及时见解。