Perceptual experiences have presentational phenomenology: we seem to encounter real situations in the course of visual experiences, for instance. The current paper articulates and defends the claim that the contents of at least some perceptual experiences are inherently presentational. On this view, perceptual contents are not always forceless in the way that, say, the propositional content that 2 + 2 = 4 is generally taken to be, as a content that may be asserted or denied or merely supposed; rather, there are perceptual contents such that any mental state or episode which has the relevant content must be one in which things seem to the given subject to be a certain way. Intuitive motivation for the view is presented and an explanatory line of argument in support of it is developed: it is argued that the recognition of inherently presentational perceptual contents allows us to explain certain representational limitations to which ordinary visualizations and other forms of perceptual mental imagery are subject. Some potential objections to the position are explored, leading to further elaboration of it.

中文翻译：

---

感知、力量和内容

感知体验具有表象现象学：例如，我们在视觉体验过程中似乎遇到了真实的情况。本文阐明并捍卫了这样的观点：至少某些感知体验的内容本质上是表象的。根据这种观点，感知内容并不总是像2+2=4这样的命题内容一般被认为是可以断言、否定或仅仅假设的内容那样毫无力量；相反，存在感知内容，因此具有相关内容的任何心理状态或情节必定是其中事物在给定主体看来是某种方式的状态。提出了该观点的直观动机，并提出了支持该观点的解释性论点：有人认为，对固有表象感知内容的认识使我们能够解释普通可视化和其他形式的感知心理意象所受到的某些表象限制。探讨了对该立场的一些潜在反对意见，从而对其进行了进一步阐述。