According to a dominant assumption the truth of instrumental thoughts—thoughts in which one action is identified as a means to another—are not affected by agents’ normative conceptions of their ends. Agents could in principle grasp these thoughts, and thereby the correct means to their ends, without consulting any conception they may have as to the pursuit-worthiness of those ends. I argue this assumption (the ‘Theoretical Conception’) prevents us from explaining how agents can identify means to their ends. I sketch an alternative account according to which the contents of instrumental thoughts are directly determined by agent's reasons for acting. This is explained by the fact that an agent's reasons for action reveal what they take the good of their ends to be. Ultimately, I argue, agents must have a conception of their final ends as intrinsically good if they are to successfully specify means to them.

中文翻译：

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工具性思想的两种概念

根据一个占主导地位的假设，工具性思想的真实性——一种行为被认为是另一种行为的手段的思想——不受主体对其目的的规范概念的影响。原则上，代理人可以掌握这些想法，从而掌握实现其目标的正确手段，而无需咨询他们对这些目标的追求价值的任何概念。我认为这个假设（“理论概念”）阻止我们解释主体如何识别达到其目的的手段。我勾勒出另一种解释，根据该解释，工具性思想的内容直接由行动者的行动原因决定。这是因为代理人的行动理由揭示了他们认为自己的最终利益是什么。最终，我认为，