In Liberalism, Neutrality, and the Gendered Division of Labor, Gina Schouten argues that political liberalism can support remedies to the gendered division of labor (henceforth GDL). Schouten defends policy proposals designed to incentivize men's uptake of caregiving responsibility in order to move us beyond the stalled revolution in gender equality, wherein gendered norms endorse and support the perpetuation of gendered caregiving norms, continuing today as “specialization-lite.” The book is a rigorously argued work that explicates the core commitments of political liberalism, attempting to deploy these theoretical resources to obtain a state of affairs she calls “gender egalitarianism.” Despite the lucidity of her argument, one that is as close to a valid argument as one can find in political philosophy, Schouten's justification for her preferred changes to the GDL fails due to the content of its claims about autonomy. More specifically, I will argue that: (1) Schouten's argument about autonomy does not appreciate the complexity with which individuals exercise autonomous capacities in oppressive contexts; (2) role modeling for autonomy is not a homogenous phenomenon; and (3) the nature of the obstacle presented by the gendered division of labor will vary for women in different groups and social positions, and it should not be assumed that an obstacle to the autonomy of white women necessarily poses a greater obstacle to the autonomy of women of color.

Let us begin with a brief summary of the way Schouten links a neutral idea of mutual acceptability to comprehensive autonomy. Defined contrastively with comprehensive liberalism, political liberalism claims that the justification of state power cannot rely on the endorsement of comprehensive autonomy, for doing so would simply render liberalism another sectarian doctrine. On Schouten's political liberalism, though, a legitimate use of state power can have a principal aim of promoting comprehensive autonomy as long as the reasons for intervention are mutually acceptable (183). What “mutual acceptability” means here is that political liberalism's reciprocity constraint is satisfied if political interventions can be justified on the basis of “citizenship interests.” Because “citizenship interests” is a normative concept, and mutual acceptability does not amount to real persons offering reasons to one another, the content of “citizenship interests” plays an important role in the argument. These citizenship interests include: “a higher-order interest in protecting that capacity [to form, reflect, and revise their philosophical, religious, or moral outlook on life], which includes an interest in preserving the conditions under which they can revise their conception of the good” (184). The conclusion of this line of argument is that “protecting the capacity for revising one's conception of the good requires ensuring the capacity for comprehensively autonomous reflection and action” (184). Consequently, for Schouten, the normative conception of citizenship interests ultimately justifies “subsidies for the actual enactment of lifestyles that celebrate and enact comprehensive autonomy” (184).

Schouten's view is that the visibility of role models exercising comprehensive autonomy will give us assurance that people will develop a capacity to revise their conception of the good, where the person who is aided by those who are exercising comprehensive autonomy is immersed in a lifestyle that discourages that capacity. The immersion condition is a description of a situation. The role modeling claim asserts a connection between a person who satisfies the immersion condition and the presence and visibility of role models of comprehensive autonomy.

Although an “assurance” is weaker than a necessary condition, it nonetheless asserts a strong connection, one that is closer to a guarantee than a mere positive correlation. With her claim about a causal relationship between the presence of role models and the development of the capacity for comprehensively autonomous reflection and action, Schouten's argument moves into the sphere of nonideal theory, where the use of idealizations must be defended.

自由主义、中立性和性别分工吉娜·舒腾 (Gina Schouten) 认为，政治自由主义可以支持性别分工（以下简称 GDL）的补救措施。舒腾捍卫了旨在激励男性承担照料责任的政策建议，以便让我们超越停滞不前的性别平等革命，其中性别规范认可并支持性别照料规范的永久存在，并以“专业化精简”的形式继续存在。这本书是一部论证严谨的著作，阐明了政治自由主义的核心承诺，试图利用这些理论资源来实现她所说的“性别平等主义”。尽管她的论点很清晰，是政治哲学中最接近有效论点的，由于 GDL 中关于自治的内容，Schouten 对她倾向于修改 GDL 的理由失败了。更具体地说，我认为：（1）舒顿关于自主权的论点没有认识到个人在压迫环境中行使自主能力的复杂性；(2) 自主性的角色塑造不是同质现象；(3) 性别分工所带来的障碍的性质对于不同群体和社会地位的妇女来说是不同的，不应认为对白人妇女的自主权的障碍必然对白人妇女的自主权构成更大的障碍的有色人种女性。(1) 舒顿关于自主权的论点没有认识到个人在压迫环境下行使自主能力的复杂性；(2) 自主性的角色塑造不是同质现象；(3) 性别分工所带来的障碍的性质对于不同群体和社会地位的妇女来说是不同的，不应认为对白人妇女的自主权的障碍必然对白人妇女的自主权构成更大的障碍的有色人种女性。(1) 舒顿关于自主权的论点没有认识到个人在压迫环境下行使自主能力的复杂性；（2）自主性的角色塑造不是同质现象；(3) 性别分工所带来的障碍的性质对于不同群体和社会地位的妇女来说是不同的，不应认为对白人妇女的自主权的障碍必然对白人妇女的自主权构成更大的障碍的有色人种女性。

让我们首先简要总结一下舒顿如何将相互可接受的中立理念与全面自治联系起来。与全面自由主义相反，政治自由主义声称国家权力的正当性不能依赖于全面自治的认可，因为这样做只会使自由主义成为另一种宗派学说。然而，根据舒顿的政治自由主义，合法使用国家权力的主要目的是促进只要干预的理由是双方都能接受的，就可以享有全面的自治权（183）。这里的“相互接受”意味着，如果政治干预能够在“公民利益”的基础上获得正当性，那么政治自由主义的互惠约束就得到了满足。由于“公民利益”是一个规范性概念，相互接受并不等于真人互相讲理，因此“公民利益”的内容在争论中起着重要作用。这些公民利益包括：“保护这种能力（形成、反映和修正他们的哲学、宗教或道德人生观）的更高层次的利益，其中包括维护他们可以修正他们的观念的条件的利益”善”（184）。这一论点的结论是“保护修正善观念的能力需要确保全面自主的反思和行动的能力”（184）。因此，对于舒顿来说，公民利益的规范概念最终证明了“为庆祝和实施全面自治的生活方式的实际实施提供补贴”（184）。

舒腾的观点是，行使全面自主权的榜样的可见性将使我们确信，人们将发展出一种能力来修正他们的善意观念，在这种情况下，受到行使全面自主权的人帮助的人会陷入一种不鼓励的生活方式。那个能力。沉浸条件是对情况的描述。角色建模主张断言满足沉浸条件的人与全面自主的角色模型的存在和可见性之间存在联系。

尽管“保证”比必要条件弱，但它仍然断言了一种很强的联系，这种联系比单纯的正相关更接近保证。舒顿主张榜样的存在与全面自主反思和行动能力的发展之间存在因果关系，她的论点进入了非理想理论领域，必须捍卫理想化的使用。