This essay argues for a new conception of bad faith based partly on Harry Frankfurt's famous account of personal autonomy in terms of higher-order volitions and caring, and based partly on Sartre's insights concerning tacit or pre-thetic attitudes and “transcendent” freedom. Although Sartre and Frankfurt have rarely been connected, Frankfurt's concepts of volitional “wantonness” and “bullshit” (wantonness about truth) are similar in certain revealing respects to Sartre's account of bad faith. However, Sartre leaves no room for Frankfurt's central point that people can volitionally commit themselves to develop certain motives and reduce others, thereby shaping an authentic identity through volitional “identification” and “alienation” of motives. Frankfurt in turn minimizes the role that a sense of liberty to form and alter higher-order volitions plays in experiences of autonomy, which Sartre recognizes in the transcendence of the “for-itself.” When these points are combined, we get a tri-level theory of intrasubjective volitional stances that explains Sartre's cases better than his own theory can, and also clarifies how sincere or procedurally autonomous self-relation is possible.

中文翻译：

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萨特和法兰克福：恶意作为三个层次的意志意识的证据

本文主张一种新的恶意概念，部分基于哈利·法兰克福关于高阶意志和关怀方面的个人自主性的著名论述，部分基于萨特关于默示或先入为主的态度和“超越”自由的见解。尽管萨特和法兰克福很少有联系，但法兰克福的意志“肆意”和“胡说”（对真理的肆意）概念在某些揭示性方面与萨特对恶意的描述相似。然而，萨特没有为法兰克福的中心论点留下余地，即人们可以自愿致力于发展某些动机并减少其他动机，从而通过动机的自愿“认同”和“异化”来塑造真实的身份。法兰克福反过来又最小化了形成和改变高阶意志的自由感在自主体验中所起的作用，萨特在“自为”的超越中认识到了这一点。当这些观点结合起来时，我们得到了主体内意志立场的三层理论，它比萨特自己的理论更好地解释了萨特的案例，并且还阐明了真诚的或程序上自主的自我关系是如何可能的。