This paper is focused on F. W. J. Schelling's view of freedom during the period of the Freiheitsschrift (1809) and related works. It is argued that the standard way this has been understood may be too simplistic. On this standard interpretation of his view, evil is made a matter of free choice by the agent, but where the choice does not concern individual actions, but the choice of the agent's essence in an atemporal act. As a result of this choice, it is argued, Schelling can then make evil imputable. By contrast, I argue that for Schelling freedom does not involve choice, but necessity, but in a way that is still internal to the agent and hence non-coercive, and thus in a way that remains free and makes evil imputable. How Schelling comes to have this view is considered, and some responses are given to ways it might be challenged both interpretatively and philosophically.

中文翻译：

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谢林论自由、邪恶和归咎：一个谜题

本文主要研究《自由文本》时期FWJ谢林的自由观（1809）及相关作品。有人认为，理解这一点的标准方式可能过于简单化。根据他的观点的标准解释，邪恶是行为者自由选择的问题，但这种选择并不涉及个人行为，而是行为者在非时间性行为中的本质选择。有人认为，由于这一选择，谢林可以将邪恶归咎于他人。相比之下，我认为，对于谢林来说，自由并不涉及选择，而是必然性，但其方式仍然是主体内部的，因此是非强制性的，因此是以一种保持自由并使邪恶可归咎的方式。我们考虑了谢林如何得出这一观点，并对它可能在解释和哲学上受到挑战的方式给出了一些回应。