Irad Kimhi considers the conundrum, first addressed by Parmenides, of how negative facts can be the case and be thought, to be the puzzle that philosophy has been working to solve since Plato and Aristotle and wants to do his part by criticizing Frege's dissociation of sense and force and developing a more Aristotelian account of judgment. Michael Della Rocca considers the conundrum a hopeless aporia that we must avoid by embracing Parmenides' radical monism of being and in a recent article (“Parmenides' insight and the possibility of logic”) aims to show that Kimhi is confronted with exactly the kind of insoluble difficulties that he that finds in Frege. The present article agrees with Kimhi that we can think about what is not the case, although thinking reaches all the way to what IS the case. But Della Rocca is right that Kimhi cannot explain by virtue of what we are able to do this. The counter-proposal says: (1) Thinking reaches to being in that we have learned to read things in the intersubjective spatial field of consciousness as model tokens of singular propositions about them. (2) Negation can be thought of because thinking has its very origin in absolute, non-well-founded negation.

中文翻译：

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消极情绪的刺痛：Irad Kimhi 和 Michael Della Rocca 谈巴门尼德挑战

伊拉德·金希 (Irad Kimhi) 认为巴门尼德首先提出的难题，即消极事实如何成为事实并被思考，是自柏拉图和亚里士多德以来哲学一直致力于解决的难题，并希望通过批评弗雷格的意义分离来尽自己的一份力量和力量，并发展出一种更加亚里士多德式的判断力解释。迈克尔·德拉·罗卡（Michael Della Rocca）认为这个难题是一个无望的难题，我们必须通过拥抱巴门尼德的激进一元论来避免这个难题，并且在最近的一篇文章（“巴门尼德的洞察力和逻辑的可能性”）中旨在表明基姆希所面临的正是这种困境。他在弗雷格身上发现了无法解决的困难。本文同意 Kimhi 的观点，即我们可以思考并非如此的情况，尽管思考一直延伸到实际情况。但德拉·罗卡（Della Rocca）是对的，基姆希无法凭借我们的能力来解释这一点。反建议说：（1）思考达到了存在，因为我们已经学会了在意识的主体间空间领域中阅读事物，作为关于它们的单一命题的模型标记。(2) 否定可以被思考，因为思维的根源在于绝对的、没有充分根据的否定。