W.V. Quine and Ludwig Wittgenstein have been compared with regard to the analytic/synthetic distinction, propositions known a priori or a posteriori, mathematical and logical necessity and naturalism, amongst other topics. Following Pieranna Garavaso and Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, I compare how Quine and Wittgenstein conceptualize a system of beliefs. Overlooked is Wittgenstein's description of the role of propositions and Quine's description of the location of propositions. The difference between the role and location signals a difference in how these frameworks conceptualize the boundary between empirical and logical propositions, and in particular the justificatory status of propositions in the system. The Wittgensteinian framework accommodates a change in the justificatory status of propositions: propositions can play at one time a rule-like role and at another time an empirical role. For Quine, change in status refers to revising the proposition (or not) in the light of recalcitrant evidence.

中文翻译：

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奎因和维特根斯坦之间的整体相似性

WV 奎因和路德维希·维特根斯坦在分析/综合区别、先验或后验命题、数学和逻辑必然性以及自然主义等主题方面进行了比较。继皮尔安娜·加拉瓦索（Pieranna Garavaso）和丹妮尔·莫亚尔-沙罗克（Danièle Moyal-Sharrock）之后，我比较了蒯因和维特根斯坦如何概念化信仰体系。维特根斯坦对命题作用的描述和蒯因对命题位置的描述被忽视了。角色和位置之间的差异标志着这些框架如何概念化经验命题和逻辑命题之间的边界，特别是系统中命题的正当性地位的差异。维特根斯坦的框架适应了命题正当性地位的变化：命题有时可以发挥类似规则的作用，有时又可以发挥经验的作用。对于蒯因来说，地位的改变是指根据顽固的证据修改（或不修改）命题。