A notable feature of our practice of blaming is that blamees can dismiss blame for their own blameworthy actions when the blamer is censuring them hypocritically and, as it is often put, lacks standing to blame them as a result. This feature has received a good deal of philosophical attention in recent years. By contrast, no attention has been given the possibility that, likewise, refraining from blaming can be hypocritical and dismissed as standingless. I argue that hypocritical refrainers have a duty to blame, if asked to do so, and possibly even if they are not asked to do so. Acknowledging this fact about hypocritical silence is crucial to an adequate understanding of our practice of blaming. Specifically, it bears on a worry that naturally arises when we consider cases where the blamee is blameworthy yet the blaming is problematic, because standingless. The worry is that, absurdly, the idea of standing justifies our being more interested in silencing preachers of virtue than making wrongdoers overcome vice. However, if one can lack standing not to blame, this concern is unwarranted. If there is such a thing as standing to blame, then sometimes one must, for reasons of standing, speak up in the face of wrongdoing, meaning, in effect, that one lacks the right not to challenge wrongdoers to improve.

中文翻译：

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不保持沉默的责任：虚伪和缺乏不责备的立场

我们指责实践的一个显着特点是，当指责者虚伪地谴责他们时，指责者可以驳回对自己应受指责的行为的指责，并且正如人们常说的那样，因此缺乏指责他们的资格。近年来，这一特征受到了哲学界的广泛关注。相比之下，没有人注意到这样一种可能性：同样，不责备可能是虚伪的，并且被认为是站不住脚的。我认为，如果被要求这样做，甚至即使没有被要求这样做，虚伪的克制者也有责任受到指责。承认虚伪沉默这一事实对于充分理解我们的指责行为至关重要。具体来说，当我们考虑被指责者有罪但指责却有问题的情况时，它自然会产生一种担忧，因为站立不稳。荒谬的是，令人担忧的是，站立的想法证明我们更感兴趣的是让美德传教士闭嘴，而不是让不法之徒克服罪恶。然而，如果一个人没有立场不去责怪，那么这种担心是没有根据的。如果存在“站得住脚”这样的事情，那么有时，出于站得住脚的原因，一个人必须在面对不法行为时大声疾呼，这实际上意味着，一个人缺乏不挑战不法行为者以改进的权利。