Theories in the cognitive science of religion (CSR) are sometimes seen as debunking religious or supernatural beliefs (SBs). To date, arguments have been produced by proponents on both sides, with some claiming that debunking would result and others claiming that it would not. In this paper, I depart from the approach taken by others and offer an approach based in broadly Bayesian methods of updating subjective probability assignments, including classical Bayesian formulas as well as comparative ratios and Jeffrey conditionalization. I argue that debunking may take place, but only if specified conditions are met. One way to show that debunking takes place would be to show that the probability of some CSR theory naturalistically explaining SBs diminishes when it is postulated that SBs have epistemic warrant. Another alternative would be to show that CSR theories are less likely to succeed in explaining the origin of SBs if SBs have warrant than if they lack warrant. It can also be helpful to consider the role played by uncertain and even ineffable judgments. Either way, debunking SBs does not follow simply from CSR but must be considered in light of prior epistemic commitments and the role they play in evaluating probabilities.

宗教认知科学 (CSR) 中的理论有时被视为揭穿宗教或超自然信仰 (SB)。迄今为止，双方的支持者都提出了论点，一些人声称会导致揭穿真相，而另一些人则声称不会。在本文中，我偏离了其他人所采用的方法，并提供了一种基于广泛贝叶斯方法的更新主观概率分配的方法，包括经典贝叶斯公式以及比较比率和杰弗里条件化。我认为揭穿可能会发生，但前提是满足特定的条件。证明揭穿发生的一种方法是，当假设 SB 具有认知依据时，某些企业社会责任理论自然地解释 SB 的可能性就会减小。另一种选择是表明，如果 SB 有依据，那么企业社会责任理论不太可能成功解释 SB 的起源，而如果 SB 缺乏依据的话。考虑不确定甚至不可言喻的判断所扮演的角色也可能会有所帮助。不管怎样，揭穿SB并不能简单地遵循企业社会责任，而是必须根据先前的认知承诺及其在评估概率中发挥的作用来考虑。