Nietzsche's injunction to examine “the value of values” can be heard in a pragmatic key, as inviting us to consider not whether certain values are true, but what they do for us. This oddly neglected pragmatic approach to Nietzsche now receives authoritative support from Bernard Reginster's new book, which offers a compelling and notably cohesive interpretation of Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morality. In this essay, I reconstruct Reginster's account of Nietzsche's critique of morality as a “self-undermining functionality critique” and raise three problems for it: (i) Is there room within an etiological conception of function for the notion of self-undermining functionality? (ii) If Nietzsche's critique is internal and based solely on the function it ascribes to morality, where does that critique derive its normative significance from? (iii) Does Reginster's account not make out ascetic morality to be more universally dysfunctional than it is, given that some priestly types have done remarkably well out of morality?

中文翻译：

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论道德的自我破坏功能批判

尼采关于检验“价值观的价值”的命令可以从务实的语气中听到，因为他邀请我们考虑的不是某些价值观是否真实，而是它们对我们做了什么。这种奇怪地被忽视的尼采实用主义方法现在得到了伯纳德·雷金斯特新书的权威支持，该书对尼采的《道德谱系》提供了令人信服且非常有凝聚力的解释。在这篇文章中，我将雷金斯特对尼采道德批判的解释重构为“自我破坏功能批判”，并为此提出了三个问题：（i）功能的病因学概念中是否存在自我破坏功能概念的空间？（ii）如果尼采的批判是内在的，并且仅仅基于它赋予道德的功能，那么这种批判的规范意义从何而来？（iii）考虑到某些祭司类型在道德方面做得非常好，雷金斯特的说法是否没有表明禁欲主义道德比实际情况更普遍地失调？