Research on contractual governance has traditionally viewed exchange hazards as having mutual effects on contractual design at the transaction level. To advance our understanding of contracting decisions in interorganizational relationships, I depart from the traditional emphasis on the mutual aspects of interorganizational relationships by examining how exposure to idiosyncratic exchange hazards may impact the divergent contractual arrangement interests of each side of the dyad. Viewing the locus of exchange hazards and contract design as dyadic broadens the conventional emphasis on the add-on perspective of governing relationships to further emphasize how excluding contractual rights selectively may be an alternative way for controlling the threat of exchange hazards. Through an analysis of franchise disclosure documents and contracts for 136 restaurant franchise systems in the U.S., I found that, when confronted with exchange hazards, a firm can strengthen its own protection not only by enhancing contractual rights in its own interests but also by limiting contractual rights in favor of its partner. With a dyadic perspective, my paper sheds new light on the discriminating alignment principle and generates new insights into the strategic implications of intentionally leaving gaps in contracts.

契约治理的研究传统上认为交换风险对交易层面的契约设计具有相互影响。为了加深我们对组织间关系中契约决策的理解，我偏离了对组织间关系相互方面的传统强调，通过研究特殊交换风险的暴露可能如何影响二元体每一方不同的契约安排利益。将交换风险和合同设计视为二元关系，扩大了对治理关系附加视角的传统重视，进一步强调有选择地排除合同权利可能是控制交换风险威胁的另一种方法。通过对美国136家餐厅特许经营系统的特许经营披露文件和合同的分析，我发现，当面临汇率风险时，企业不仅可以通过增强自身利益的合同权利，还可以通过限制合同权利来加强自身保护。有利于其合作伙伴的权利。从二元的角度来看，我的论文对歧视性联盟原则提供了新的认识，并对故意在合同中留下空白的战略影响产生了新的见解。