In The Epistemic Role of Consciousness, I defend phenomenal accessibilism, which is a version of evidentialism that combines phenomenalism about evidence with accessibilism about the evidential support relation. My critics in this symposium challenge phenomenal accessibilism from various angles. Richard Feldman accepts phenomenalism, although he rejects my version of accessibilism. In contrast, Daniel Greco accepts accessibilism, but he rejects phenomenalism. Meanwhile, Anna-Sara Malmgren rejects both phenomenalism and accessibilism. This means that all four quadrants of the matrix below are occupied in this symposium:

I am grateful to all three critics not only for their challenging comments on my book, but also for their own positive contributions to epistemology from which I have learned so much.

在《意识的认知作用》中，我为现象可及性辩护，这是证据主义的一种版本，它将证据的现象主义与证据支持关系的可及性结合起来。我在这次研讨会上的批评者从不同角度挑战了现象级的无障碍主义。理查德·费尔德曼接受现象主义，尽管他拒绝我的无障碍主义版本。相比之下，丹尼尔·格列柯接受无障碍主义，但拒绝现象主义。与此同时，安娜-萨拉·马尔姆格伦拒绝现象主义和可达主义。这意味着本次研讨会占据了以下矩阵的所有四个象限：

我感谢三位批评家，不仅感谢他们对我的书提出的具有挑战性的评论，而且感谢他们对认识论的积极贡献，我从中学到了很多东西。