The prospect of a rival opportunistically pressing for gains while one is at war with another rival highly influenced Britain's “two-power standard” as well as the US's “two-war standard.” Conflict scholars have documented numerous instances of third-party opportunism. I analyze a game-theoretic model of crisis bargaining in the shadow of third-party opportunism. Under complete information, a country with multiple rivals, that lacks overwhelming military power, incurs bargaining vulnerabilities with each rival due to potential opportunism by the others. Under incomplete information, uncertainty across dyads can lead to war even if there is complete information within dyads, adding more uncertainty to the interaction can actually reduce the likelihood of war, resolve across disputes can be endogenously correlated in equilibrium (in contrast to the exogenous assumption of reputational models), and a commitment problem can be conducive to peace rather than war.

中文翻译：

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第三方机会主义阴影下的危机讨价还价

一个对手在与另一个对手交战时机会主义地追求利益的前景极大地影响了英国的“双强标准”以及美国的“两战标准”。冲突学者记录了许多第三方机会主义的例子。我分析了第三方机会主义阴影下危机谈判的博弈论模型。在完全信息的情况下，一个拥有多个对手的国家，如果缺乏压倒性的军事实力，由于其他对手潜在的机会主义，在与每个对手的谈判中都存在漏洞。在不完整的信息下，即使二人内部有完整的信息，二人之间的不确定性也可能导致战争，为互动增加更多的不确定性实际上可以降低战争的可能性，