Evolutionary debunking arguments purport to show that, if moral realism is true, all of our moral beliefs are unjustified. In this paper, I respond to two of the most enduring objections that have been raised against these arguments. The first objection claims that evolutionary debunking arguments are self-undermining, because they cannot be formulated without invoking epistemic principles, and epistemic principles are just as vulnerable to debunking as our moral beliefs. I argue that this objection suffers from several defects, the most serious of which is that it has the unpalatable consequence that we should never revise our moral beliefs in response to evidence that our capacity for normative cognition is globally impaired. The second objection, which comes to us from Katia Vavova, claims that evolutionary debunking arguments are doomed to fail, because they attempt to show that our moral beliefs are unreliable without making any assumptions about the nature of morality, and this is impossible. I argue, to the contrary, that the etiological higher-order evidence cited by debunking arguments can give us good reason to think that our moral beliefs are unreliable, even if we make no assumptions about what morality is like.

中文翻译：

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重新校准进化论的揭穿

揭穿进化论的论点旨在表明，如果道德现实主义是正确的，那么我们所有的道德信仰都是不合理的。在本文中，我对针对这些论点提出的两个最持久的反对意见做出了回应。第一个反对意见声称，揭穿进化论的论点是自我破坏的，因为如果不援引认知原则就无法阐述它们，而认知原则和我们的道德信仰一样容易被揭穿。我认为这种反对意见有几个缺陷，其中最严重的是它会产生令人不快的后果，即我们永远不应该根据我们的规范认知能力在全球范围内受损的证据来修改我们的道德信仰。第二个反对意见来自卡蒂亚·瓦沃娃（Katia Vavova），她声称揭穿进化论的论点注定会失败，因为它们试图在不对道德本质做出任何假设的情况下证明我们的道德信仰是不可靠的，而这是不可能的。相反，我认为，揭穿论点所引用的病因学高阶证据可以让我们有充分的理由认为我们的道德信仰是不可靠的，即使我们对道德是什么样的没有做出任何假设。