Philosophy is witnessing an “Agential Turn,” characterised by the thought that explaining certain distinctive features of human mentality requires conceiving of many mental phenomena as acts, and of subjects as their agents. We raise a challenge for three central explanatory appeals to mental agency––agentialism about doxastic responsibility, agentialism about doxastic self-knowledge, and an agentialist explanation of the delusion of thought insertion: agentialists either commit themselves to implausibly strong claims about the kind of agency involved in the relevant phenomena, or make appeals to agency which seem explanatorily redundant. The agentialist literature does not contain a clear answer to this Agentialist Dilemma, and we put it forward here as a core challenge for the Agential Turn. But we also accept the fundamental motivation behind the Agential Turn, its critique and rejection of a purely passivist and spectatorial conception of the human mind. We close by urging the recognition of a broader category of rational subjectivity, a category which includes states which are neither active nor passive, but nevertheless form part of a subject's rational point of view on the world.

中文翻译：

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心理能动性和理性主体性

哲学正在见证一场“主体转向”，其特点是认为解释人类心理的某些独特特征需要将许多心理现象视为行为，并将主体视为其主体。我们对心理能动性的三个核心解释诉求提出了挑战——关于信念责任的行动主义、关于信念自我认识的行动主义、以及对思想插入妄想的行动主义解释：行动主义者要么致力于对这种能动性提出令人难以置信的强烈主张参与相关现象，或向机构提出上诉，这些似乎解释起来是多余的。代理主义文献并未包含对代理主义困境的明确答案，我们在此将其作为代理转向的核心挑战提出。但我们也接受主体转向背后的根本动机，即它对人类心灵的纯粹被动主义和旁观观念的批判和拒绝。最后，我们敦促承认更广泛的理性主体性类别，这一类别包括既不是主动也不是被动的国家，但仍然构成主体对世界的理性观点的一部分。