Perception is riddled with cases of reliable misperception. These are cases in which a perceptual state is tokened inaccurately any time it is tokened under normal conditions. On the face of it, this fact causes trouble for theories that provide an analysis of perceptual content in non-semantic, non-intentional, and non-phenomenal terms, such as those found in Millikan (1984), Fodor (1990), Neander (2017), and Schellenberg (2018). I show how such theories can be extended so that they cover such cases without giving up their core commitments.

中文翻译：

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知觉内容理论和可靠的空间误解案例

感知中充满了可靠的错误感知的例子。在这些情况下，在正常条件下，任何时候对感知状态的标记都是不准确的。从表面上看，这一事实给以非语义、非意图和非现象术语提供感知内容分析的理论带来了麻烦，例如 Millikan (1984)、Fodor (1990)、Neander 中的理论（2017）和谢伦伯格（2018）。我将展示如何扩展这些理论，以便在不放弃其核心承诺的情况下涵盖此类案例。