Dasgupta poses a serious challenge to realism about natural properties. He argues that there is no acceptable explanation of why natural properties deserve the value realists assign to them and are consequently absent of value. In response, this paper defines and defends an alternative non-explanatory account of normativity compatible with realism. Unlike Lewis and Sider, who believe it is sufficient to defend realism solely on realist terms, I engage with the challenge on unfriendly grounds by revealing a tu quoque. Dasgupta and anti-realists face a similar challenge to that directed against realism: one that not only undermines the objection to realism by legitimising non-explanatory normativity but leaves them facing a significant dilemma.

中文翻译：

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现实主义与解释的价值

达斯古普塔对自然属性的现实主义提出了严峻挑战。他认为，对于为什么自然属性值得现实主义者赋予它们的价值并因此没有价值，没有可接受的解释。作为回应，本文定义并捍卫了另一种与现实主义相容的规范性非解释性解释。与 Lewis 和 Sider 不同，他们认为仅仅根据现实主义的术语来捍卫现实主义就足够了，我以不友好的理由通过揭示现状来应对挑战。达斯古普塔和反现实主义者面临着与针对现实主义的挑战类似的挑战：这一挑战不仅通过使非解释性规范性合法化来削弱对现实主义的反对，而且使他们面临重大的困境。