External state support to non-state armed groups is commonly seen as a direct relationship between a state sponsor and a rebel group. But powerful states often use third-party states as conduits of military aid. These intermediary states are secondary, subordinate principals that are part of extended chains of “dual delegation.” Because intermediaries are likely to have their own separate agendas, powerful states often face a double principal-agent problem when providing material support to rebel groups. The difficulties and problems associated with controlling the agent are reflected in the relationship between the principal and the intermediary. States need to identify the alignment of interests at an early stage, or risk strategic failure. There are two ideal types of intermediaries—dealers and brokers. Case studies of the United States’ support to the Mujahideen in Afghanistan and to UNITA in Angola (channeled through Pakistan and Zaire, respectively) demonstrate that intermediaries affect the provision of external support. States engaging in counterterrorism need to look beyond sponsors of terrorism and explore the role of all states involved in the process of conflict delegation. That states use intermediaries when providing support to non-state armed groups indicates that holding states accountable for violating the nonintervention principle under international law should be reconsidered.

外部国家对非国家武装团体的支持通常被视为国家支持者与反叛团体之间的直接关系。但强大的国家经常使用第三方国家作为军事援助的渠道。这些中间状态是次要的、从属的委托人，它们是“双重授权”扩展链的一部分。由于中间人很可能有自己不同的议程，强国在向反叛团体提供物质支持时往往面临双重委托-代理问题。控制代理人的困难和问题体现在委托人和中介人的关系上。各国需要在早期确定利益的一致性，否则就有战略失败的风险。有两种理想的中介类型——交易商和经纪人。美国支持阿富汗圣战者组织和安哥拉安盟（分别通过巴基斯坦和扎伊尔）的案例研究表明，中间人影响外部支持的提供。参与反恐的国家需要超越恐怖主义的支持者，探索所有参与冲突授权过程的国家的作用。国家在向非国家武装团体提供支持时使用中间人表明，应重新考虑追究国家违反国际法不干涉原则的责任。参与反恐的国家需要超越恐怖主义的支持者，探索所有参与冲突授权过程的国家的作用。国家在向非国家武装团体提供支持时使用中间人表明，应重新考虑追究国家违反国际法不干涉原则的责任。参与反恐的国家需要超越恐怖主义的支持者，探索所有参与冲突授权过程的国家的作用。国家在向非国家武装团体提供支持时使用中间人表明，应重新考虑追究国家违反国际法不干涉原则的责任。