This paper aims to discuss a well-known concept from argumentation theory, namely the principle of charity. It will show that this principle, especially in its contemporary version as formulated by Donald Davidson, meets with some serious problems. Since we need the principle of charity in any kind of critical discussion, we propose the way of modifying it according to the presupponendum—the rule written in the sixteenth century by Ignatius Loyola. While also corresponding with pragma-dialectical rules, it also provides additional content. This will be termed the dialectical principle of charity, and it offers a few steps to be performed during an argument in order to make sure that the participants understand each other well and are not deceived by any cognitive bias. The meaning of these results could be of great significance for argumentation theory, pragma-dialectics and the practice of public discourse as it enhances the principle of charity and makes it easier to apply in argumentation.

本文旨在讨论论证理论中一个著名的概念，即慈善原则。它将表明这一原则，尤其是唐纳德戴维森制定的当代版本，遇到了一些严重的问题。由于我们在任何类型的批判性讨论中都需要慈善原则，因此我们提出了根据前提条件修改它的方式——Ignatius Loyola 在 16 世纪写下的规则。在对应语用辩证规则的同时，也提供了额外的内容。这将被称为慈善的辩证原则，它提供了在争论中要执行的几个步骤，以确保参与者相互理解并且不被任何认知偏见所欺骗。这些结果的意义对于论证理论、语用辩证法和公共话语实践具有重要意义，因为它增强了慈善原则并使其更容易应用于论证。